

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 014672 TOSEC 010067

EXDIS, TO THE SECRETARY FROM ACTING SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, SO, ET, US

SUBJ: ACTION MEMORANDUM: THE OGADEN CONFLICT: ANALYSIS  
AND RECOMMENDED ACTIONS DESIGNED TO PROMOTE A NEGOTIATED  
SETTLEMENT.

(S/S 7801052)

1. ISSUES FOR DECISION:

YOU ARE ASKED TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE THE INITIATION OF THE  
FOLLOWING US ACTIONS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR  
A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE OGADEN CONFLICT:

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-- CONSULTATIONS WITH THE BRITISH, FRENCH, GERMANS AND  
ITALIANS TO ENSURE THAT THEY PERCEIVE NO OBJECTIONS TO THE  
COURSE OF ACTION WE PLAN TO FOLLOW;

-- DISCUSSION WITH THE ITALIANS OF THE PROSPECTS WHICH A  
MEDIATION EFFORT BY THEM, PERFERABLY ENDORSED BY THE OAU,  
MIGHT HAVE;

-- AN APPROACH TO THE NIGERIANS TO URGE THEM TO REINVIGORATE THE EFFORTS OF THE OAU MEDITATION COMMITTEE;

-- AN APPROACH TO THE MALAGASY, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THE FRENCH, TO SEEK THEIR ESTIMATE OF THE PROSPECTS FOR

THEIR EFFORTS TO GET SIAD AND MENGISTU TOGETHER TO TALK ABOUT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT;

-- RENEWED INVESTIGATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHICH PUTS THE WEIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BEHIND THE OAU EFFORT TO MEDIATE;

-- INTENSIFICATION OF THE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO SEEK THEIR COOPERATION IN CONVINCING THE ETHIOPIANS OF THE DESIRABILITY OF GOING TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE;

-- AN APPROACH TO THE YUGOSLAVS TO URGE THEM TO ENCOURAGE THE ETHIOPIANS TO SEEK A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF REGIONAL AUTONOMY SIMILAR TO THE YUGOSLAV SYSTEM;

-- AN APPROACH TO THE INDIANS TO SEE IF THEY ARE WILLING TO URGE THE ETHIOPIANS TO NEGOTIATE.

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-- CONSULTATIONS WITH SAUDIS, IRANIANS AND EGYPTIANS TO AVOID ANY MISINTERPRETATION OF OUR ACTIONS, PARTICULARLY OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, AND TO SECURE THEIR HELP IN INFLUENCING THE SOMALIS.

-- SUPPORT FOR A KENYA-SOMALIA RAPPROCHEMENT EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY.

-- IN THE COURSE OF CONSULTATIONS, SOLICIT IDEAS AND PLEDGES OF CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD REWARDS THAT MIGHT INDUCE THE ETHIOPIANS AND SOMALIS TO NEGOTIATE.

-- ENCOURAGE CONSULTATION AND HOPEFULLY COOPERATION ON THE HORN BETWEEN ARABS AND AFRICANS.

-- INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO CUBA ON THE HORN.

## 2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS:

THE SHAPE OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT HAS PROCLAIMED AS A NATIONAL POLICY GOAL THAT ALL OF THE VARIOUS "NATIONALITIES" OF ETHIOPIA SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND SELF-GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE USE OF THEIR OWN LANGUAGES AND ELECTION OF THEIR OWN LEADERS AND ADMINISTRATORS WITHIN A SYSTEM OF REGIONAL AUTONOMY. WHILE INCORPORATION OF ALL SOMALI-INHABITED AREAS INTO THE SOMALI REPUBLIC IS AN

EXPLICIT GOAL OF SOMALIA, ENSHRINED IN THE SOMALI CONSTITUTION, THE MOGADISCIO GOVERNMENT CLAIMS THAT IT IS ONLY INTERESTED IN SEEING THAT THE SOMALIS IN THE OGADEN ARE GIVEN THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THESE TWO POSITIONS WOULD APPEAR TO BE SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

A LARGELY AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT OF THE REGION OF THE OGADEN (GROG), WHICH ENABLED THE OGADENIS TO RUN THEIR OWN INTERNAL AFFAIRS FREE FROM INTERFERENCE FROM ADDIS ABABA, WOULD COME CLOSE TO SATISFYING SOMALIA'S AVOWED AIM. A CONTINUING LINK BETWEEN THE GROG AND THE ADDIS REGIME MIGHT BE DEvised WHICH WOULD SATISFY THE ETHIOPIAN DESIRE TO PRESERVE SOME MEASURE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE AREA WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE GROG'S AUTONOMY. THE AR-

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RANGEMENT WOULD PRESUMABLY REQUIRE SOME FORM OF GUARANTEE, WHETHER BIG POWER, UN, OAU, AND/OR JOINT OAU/ARAB LEAGUE. AMONG THE MANY PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE IRONED OUT WOULD BE THE QUESTION OF HOW THE GROG LEADERSHIP IS TO BE SELECTED, WHETHER FROM THE WESTERN SOMALI LIBERATION FRONT (WSLF) (WHICH IS ANATHEMA TO THE ETHIOPIANS), OR BY MEANS OF A PLEBISCITE ORGANIZED UNDER OAU OR UN AUSPICES OR BY SOME OTHER MECHANISM. ONCE THE NEGOTIATION HAD ESTABLISHED ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR GOVERNING THE OGADEN, IT COULD THEN BE TURNED INTO AN EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE A DEFINITIVE BORDER BETWEEN THE ETHIOPIAN OGADEN AND THE FORMER ITALIAN PART OF SOMALIA WHERE NOW THERE IS ONLY A "PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LINE".

BEFORE ANY NEGOTIATION COULD TAKE PLACE, THE FIGHTING WOULD HAVE TO BE STOPPED, BY CEASEFIRE OR PERHAPS BY RECOGNITION OF STALEMATE. ETHIOPIA WOULD NOT AGREE TO A SIMPLE CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE WHEN THE PLACE OCCUPIED BY SOMALIA WAS ETHIOPIAN TERRITORY. SOMALIA WOULD NOT AGREE TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM THE OGADEN AT LEAST UNTIL IT WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE WSLF AND, INDEED, THE NON-COMBATANT SOMALI INHABITANTS OF THE OGADEN WOULD BE PROTECTED FROM ETHIOPIAN REPRISALS. FOR THIS PURPOSE, IT WOULD APPEAR NECESSARY FOR A NEUTRAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE (UN, OAU, OR JOINT OAU/ARAB LEAGUE) TO BE INSERTED BETWEEN THE COMBATANTS, SUPPLEMENTED BY A NEUTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE BODY TO MONITOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOMALI GOVERNMENT FORCES AND ADMINISTER THE OGADEN UNTIL A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED.

HOW TO GET THE TWO TO NEGOTIATE.

(A) MILITARY STALEMATE

IF BOTH SIDES WERE TO BECOME CONVINCED AT THE SAME TIME THAT THEY COULD NOT ADVANCE THEIR INTERESTS ANY FURTHER BY MILITARY MEANS, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO

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ARRANGE. HOWEVER, IT IS UNLIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE THAT EITHER SIDE, LEAST OF ALL THE ETHIOPIANS, WILL BE STIMULATED BY BATTLEFIELD CONDITIONS TO TALK RATHER THAN FIGHT.

THE ETHIOPIANS ARE CONVINCED THAT THEIR SUPERIORITY IN MANPOWER AND, ONCE THE SOVIET ARMS ARE DELIVERED AND ASSIMILATED, IN FIREPOWER GUARANTEE AN ETHIOPIAN VICTORY OVER THE LONG RUN. FROM ALL INDICATIONS THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE OR NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE MAKING AT LEAST ONE MORE ATTEMPT, WITH SOVIET AND CUBAN ASSISTANCE, TO OBTAIN A MILITARY VICTORY. AN ETHIOPIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE IS EXPECTED IN MARCH OR APRIL. IT MIGHT WELL CARRY THE ETHIOPIANS INTO NORTHERN SOMALIA WITHOUT, HOWEVER, SUCCEEDING IN CLEARING THE SOMALIS FROM THE OGADEN.

THE SOMALIS, WHILE FEARFUL THAT THIS ETHIOPIAN EXPECTATION MAY BE ACCURATE, ARE BUSILY ARRANGING ARMS FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES TO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE SOVIET SUPPLIES. TOGETHER WITH SOME TERRAIN AND MORALE ADVANTAGES, THESE ARMS SUPPLIES MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE SOMALIS TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO RESIST AN ETHIOPIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE AND THAT, IN ANY CASE, THE LONGER THEY HANG ON IN THE OGADEN, THE GREATER THE CHANCE THAT THE ETHIOPIAN EMPIRE WILL CRUMBLE AND LEAVE THEM IN UNDISPUTED CONTROL OF THE OGADEN.

IF THE EXPECTED ETHIOPIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE WERE TO FAIL TO DISLODGE THE SOMALIS FROM THE OGADEN (WHATEVER SUCCESS IT MIGHT HAVE IN NORTHERN SOMALIA) AND A STALEMATE WERE TO RESULT, IT WOULD SEEM POSSIBLE TO GET BOTH TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATE. A STALEMATE RESULTING FROM FAILURE OF SOVIET SUPPORT TO CARRY THE DAY FOR THE ETHIOPIANS HAS A CERTAIN ATTRACTION SINCE SOVIET PRESTIGE WOULD SUFFER. HOWEVER, A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF ETHIOPIANS AND SOMALIS WOULD BE KILLED AND WOUNDED IN THE PROCESS. IT WOULD THEREFORE

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APPEAR TO BE IN THE US INTEREST TO MAKE AS STRENUOUS AS POSSIBLE AN EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATION WITHOUT WAIT-

ING FOR SUCH A STALEMATE: INACTIVITY ON THE HORN WHILE BLACKS KILLED BLACKS MIGHT WELL BE CONTRASTED UNFAVORABLY WITH THE INTENSITY OF OUR ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA DESIGNED TO PREVENT BLACKS AND WHITES FROM KILLING EACH

OTHER. AND POLITICS APART, HUMAN LIVES ARE AT STAKE.

(B) PERSUASION

THERE IS THE THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY OF CONVINCING BOTH SIDES THAT IT IS IN THEIR LONG-TERM INTEREST TO NEGOTIATE RATHER THAN FIGHT. WE FEEL THERE IS LOGIC TO THE POSITION WE HAVE TAKEN THAT THERE IS NO LASTING MILITARY SOLUTION TO SUCH A COMPLEX AND HISTORICAL PROBLEM AS THE OGADEN. MILITARY SUCCESS BY THE SOMALIS HAS ONLY STIMULATED THE ETHIOPIANS TO SECURE THE MILITARY SUPPORT FROM THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS WHIC; THEY FEEL THEY NEED TO LAUNCH A COUNTEROFFENSIVE. MILITARY SUCCESS BY THE ETHIOPIANS WILL NOT MEAN AN END TO THE INSURGENCY IN THE OGADEN OR THE SUPPORT FOR IT FROM SOMALIA, BUT WILL ONLY STIMULATE THE SOMALIS TO UNDERTAKE RENEWED MILITARY ACTION AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE. THE LONGER THE FIGHTING GOES ON AND THE DEAD AND WOUNDED INCREASE ON BOTH SIDES, THE MORE BITTERNESS AND DESIRE FOR REVENGE WILL BUILD UP, MAKING AN ALREADY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATING PROBLEM THAT MUCH MORE SO.

BOTH COUNTRIES ARE DESPERATELY POOR AND CAN ILL AFFORD TO SQUANDER SCARCE RESOURCES ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES. BOTH GOVERNMENTS COULD BE MORE CONFIDENT OF THEIR POSITIONS AND OF THE SUPPORT OF THEIR PEOPLES IF THEY WERE LEADING THEM TOWARD GREATER ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SECURITY RATHER THAN INTO THE DANGERS OF WAR. BOTH CAN EXPECT TO

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ACHIEVE FROM NEGOTIATIONS A RESULT WHICH, WHILE SHORT OF THEIR MAXIMUM GOALS, IS ONE THEY CAN LIVE WITH AND WHICH MIGHT EVEN LEAD TO FUTURE COOPERATION BETWEEN THEM. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FOREGOING AND OTHER ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF NEGOTIATION DEPENDS ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEIR PURVEYOR CAN COMMAND ATTENTION AND SERIOUS CONSIDERATION FOR HIS WORDS BY THE SIDE BEING SPOKEN TO. THOSE TO WHOM THE ETHIOPIANS WOULD PAY ATTENTION INCLUDE (IN DECLINING ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, THE GAP BETWEEN NO. 1 AND THE REST BEING SUBSTANTIAL);

- 1) THE SOVIETS, BECAUSE OF DEPENDENCE ON THEM FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES;
- 2) YUGOSLAVIA, BECAUSE OF A LONG-STANDING FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP, IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY, AND SUCCESS IN MAINTAIN-

ING THE NON-ALIGNED STATUS WHICH THE ETHIOPIANS CLAIM TO WANT FOR THEMSELVES. YUGOSLAVIA WOULD HAVE THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF BEING IN A POSITION TO ARGUE FROM ITS OWN EXPERIENCE THE MERITS OF A SETTLEMENT ACCORDING GENUINE REGIONAL AUTONOMY TO THE OGADEN.

- 3) CERTAIN AFRICAN LEADERS, SUCH AS NYERERE, BECAUSE OF HIS INTERNATIONAL STATURE AND IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY;

OBASANJO, BECAUSE OF NIGERIA'S IMPORTANCE AND CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA MEDIATION COMMITTEE; BONGO, AS OAU HEAD; NIMEIRI, BECAUSE OF HIS POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE IF ACTIVELY HOSTILE.

4) ITALY, FOR HISTORICAL REASONS AND BECAUSE THEY ARE THE WESTERN POWER HAVING PERHAPS THE GREATEST NUMBER OF NATIONALS LIVING IN BOTH ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA.

5) INDIA, WHICH IS BOTH A LEADING THIRD WORLD NATION AND HAS PROVIDED A MODEST AMOUNT OF MILITARY AID TO ETHIOPIA.

THOSE CAPABLE OF INFLUENCING THE SOMALIS INCLUDE:  
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1) THE SAUDIS, WHO PAY THE PIPER;

2) OTHER REGIONAL LEADERS WHOSE POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT IS IMPORTANT TO THE SOMALIS, SUCH AS SADAT, THE SHAH, NIMEIRI, ETC.

3) THE US, AS LEADER OF THE WEST FROM WHICH SOMALIA HOPES TO SECURE SUPPORT IN THE FUTURE;

4) AFRICAN LEADERS SYMPATHETIC TO THE SOMALI CAUSE (HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY) OR AT LEAST OPPOSED TO THE SOVIET ROLE IN ETHIOPIA (E.G. MOBUTU);

5) THE FRENCH, AS THE MOST "PRAGMATIC" OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES.

6) ITALY, FOR HISTORICAL REASONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY AND RESOURCEFULNESS IN PROVIDING SUPPORT MORE STRAIT-LACED WESTERNERS WOULD SHY AWAY FROM.

EFFORTS TO USE PERSUASION ARE MORE LIKELY AT THE MOMENT TO CARRY WEIGHT WITH THE SOMALIS (WHO ARE CLOSE TO THE LIMIT OF THEIR MILITARILY OBTAINABLE ADVANTAGE) THAN WITH THE ETHIOPIANS (WHO HAVE YET TO TEST THEIR NEWLY-ACQUIRED SOVIET MUSCLES). EVEN THE SOVIETS MAY BE UNABLE -- ASSUMING THEY COULD BE PREVAILED UPON TO TRY -- TO PERSUADE THE ETHIOPIANS BY LOGIC ALONE TO NEGOTIATE UNTIL THEY HAVE ATTEMPTED A COUNTER-OFFENSIVE.

(C) PRESSURE

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DIRECT PRESSURES FROM THOSE AT THE TOP OF THE ABOVE TWO LISTS OF INFLUENCERS COULD FORCE THE TWO SIDES TO NEGOTIATE. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT SAUDI PRESSURE IS ALREADY HAVING SOMETHING OF THIS EFFECT ON THE SOMALIS (THOUGH IT MIGHT NOT HAVE IF THEY HAD NOT ALREADY ACHIEVED MOST OF THEIR MILITARY GOALS AND IF THEY WERE NOT FEARFUL OF AN ETHIOPIAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE). CLEARLY, THE MOST EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON THE ETHIOPIANS WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE SOVIET UNION. STIMULATING THE SOVIETS TO DO SO UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE DIFFICULT BUT POSSIBLE (SEE SECTION 4).

(D) REWARD/PUNISHMENT

AN ADDITIONAL MEANS FOR SECURING THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH SIDES TO NEGOTIATE AND TO ABIDE BY THE TERMS OF A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT IS TO MAKE IT WORTH THEIR WHILE TO DO SO OR MAKE IT COSTLY NOT TO. THE POSITIVE PROMISE OF REWARD IS LIKELY TO BE A MORE EFFECTIVE STIMULUS TO NEGOTIATION THAN THE NEGATIVE THREAT OF DEPRIVAL OF BENEFITS NOW BEING RECEIVED, PARTICULARLY SINCE PRESENT DONORS (ESPECIALLY THE SOVIET UNION) ARE UNLIKELY TO BE AMENABLE TO THE USE OF SUCH A THREAT FOR THAT PURPOSE. THE THREAT OF DEPRIVAL OF BENEFITS BESTOWED AS A REWARD FOR NEGOTIATING WOULD, HOWEVER, BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN KEEPING THE PARTIES TO THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT.

THE PROMISE OF INCREASED ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL AID MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN INDUCING BOTH ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FUND FOR OGADEN RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (FORD) MIGHT BE AN INDUCEMENT TO BOTH ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA AS WELL AS PROVIDING THE OGADENIS ENOUGH TO LOOK FORWARD TO IN THEIR FUTURE AS AN AUTONOMOUS REGION OF ETHIOPIA TO MUTE THEIR PRESUMED DESIRES FOR INDEPENDENCE OR INCORPORATION IN SOMALIA. A MORE GENERALIZED PROMISE OF INCREASED AID TO ETHIOPIA AND

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SOMALIA BEYOND THAT GOING TO THE OGADEN MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL. IN ADDITION, AN UNDERTAKING TO REOPEN THE ADDIS ABABA-DJIBOUTI RAILWAY AND PROVIDE SOME INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE CONCERNING ITS SECURITY WOULD BE A STRONG INDUCEMENT FOR ETHIOPIA. IF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ERITREAN REBEL GROUPS WERE TO PROCEED AT MORE OR LESS THE SAME TIME AS NEGOTIATIONS ON THE OGADEN, ANOTHER STRONG INDUCEMENT FOR THE

ETHIOPIANS WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT THAT REMOVED ASSAB FROM A POSSIBLE FUTURE ERITREAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT, LEAVING THE PORT INSTEAD UNDER DIRECT ADDIS ABABA CONTROL. AMONG NON-ECONOMIC INDUCEMENTS FOR THE SOMALIS WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD ESTABLISH THE RIGHT OF SOMALI NOMADS TO FOLLOW TRADITIONAL TRANSHUMANCE PATTERNS IRRESPECTIVE OF BORDERS.

IT WOULD SEEM USEFUL IN ANY CONSULTATIONS WE UNDERTAKE ON THE OGADEN SITUATION TO SOLICIT THE VIEWS OF OTHERS ON WHAT APPROPRIATE REWARDS THERE MIGHT BE TO STIMULATE BOTH SIDES TO NEGOTIATE AND TO SECURE PLEDGES TO CONTRIBUTE, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE, FROM THOSE IN THE BEST POSITION TO DO SO, E.G. THE SAUDIS.

THE UN ROLE

THERE ARE THREE POSSIBLE ROLES THE UN MIGHT PLAY IN THE HORN CONFLICT:

-- SYG WALDHEIM COULD BE ASKED TO LEND HIS SUPPORT, PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY, TO AN EFFORT AT REINVIGORATING THE OAU MEDIATION EFFORT, OR STIMULATING A NEW EFFORT BY AFRICAN AND NON-AFRICAN POWERS. WALDHEIM WOULD BE WARY OF UNDERTAKING A ROLE WHICH MIGHT MEET WITH SOVIET OR AFRICAN OPPOSITION.

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-- THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD ACT TO RATIFY OR IMPLEMENT AN AGREEMENT REACHED BY AN OUTSIDE MEDIATION EFFORT. WHETHER THE AGREEMENT INVOLVES A GENERALIZED APPEAL TO THE PARTIES OR AN ACTIVE ROLE IN ENSURING DISENGAGEMENT, THE KEY TO SUCCESS IN THE COUNCIL WOULD BE AGREEMENT BY ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA, AND BY AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS GENERALLY.

-- THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD SERVE AS A FORUM FOR EXPRESSING CONCERN AT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HORN. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO PUT THE WEIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BEHIND THE OAU MEDIATION EFFORTS.

POSSIBLE SOVIET COOPERATION

IT SEEMS CLEAR FROM THE FOREGOING THAT PROSPECTS FOR EARLY NEGOTIATIONS PRACTICALLY REQUIRE SOVIET PRESSURE ON THE ETHIOPIANS TO THAT END, AND EVEN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE LONGER-TERM WILL SOMEHOW HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE HORN.

THE SOVIETS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS POINT THAN THE ETHIOPIANS. HAVING MADE SUCH



A LARGE COMMITMENT IN MEN AND MATERIEL, THE SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY BE RELUCTANT TO REVERSE FIELD AND ADVOCATE A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH THE ETHIOPIANS COULD VIEW AS BETRAYAL.

NEVERTHELESS, IT IS PROBABLY IN OUR INTEREST TO BEGIN TO INVOLVE THE SOVIETS IN WHATEVER NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK WE HOPE TO IMPLEMENT. WE HAVE TWO THEORETICAL WAYS TO GET THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE ETHIOPIANS IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY: THE FAMILIAR CARROT AND STICK. WE NEED TO CONSIDER WHAT SOVIET OBJECTIVES ARE IN THE HORN, TO WHAT EXTENT THEY ARE OR MIGHT BE MADE PARALLEL TO OUR OWN, AND WHAT TOOLS ARE AVAILABLE TO US TO COERCE OR INDUCE THEM TO MOVE IN DESIRED DIRECTIONS.

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THERE IS SOME DIVERSITY OF OPINION IN THE GOVERNMENT ABOUT SOVIET MOTIVES IN THE HORN BUT MOST ANALYSTS BELIEVE WITH VARYING DEGREES OF EMPHASIS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:

-- AT THE MAXIMUM TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A "TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY" TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA, OBTAIN NAVAL RIGHTS THERE TO REPLACE THE LOST BERBERA AND, MORE BROADLY, USE IT AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR EXTENDING THEIR INFLUENCE IN EAST AFRICA AND THE RED SEA AREA GENERALLY. AT A MINIMUM THEY WANT TO KEEP THE POSITION THEY HAVE IN ETHIOPIA AND AVOID EXCLUSION FROM THE HORN ALTOGETHER. THE MENGISTU REGIME MAY APPEAL TO SOME IN MOSCOW AS AN ESPECIALLY WORTHY CANDIDATE FOR HELP WHICH WAS AMPLY JUSTIFIED ON STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL GROUNDS IN ANY CASE.

-- TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE COUNTRIES OF AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND TO THE US, THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS A MAJOR FORCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THOSE REGIONS WHOSE COOPERATION IS NECESSARY IN SETTLING THEIR PROBLEMS. IT MAY BE THAT THIS GENERAL INTEREST WAS INCREASED BY THE SOVIET REACTION TO THEIR EXCLUSION FROM THE LATEST PHASE OF MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH THEY APPARENTLY SEE AS AT LEAST CONNIVED AT BY THE US AS AN END-RUN AWAY FROM THE POLICY OF THE OCTOBER 1 JOINT STATEMENT.

-- LINING UP WITH THE STRONG SENTIMENT IN AFRICA AGAINST FORCIBLE CHANGE OF FRONTIERS AND, MORE BROADLY, WITH A VICTIM OF EXTERNAL AGGRESSION.

THE SOVIETS PRESUMABLY WOULD WELCOME A CLEARCUT ETHIOPIAN VICTORY AND A LONG-TERM CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GRATE-  
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FUL ETHIOPIAN REGIME. THEY MAY, HOWEVER, HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF BOTH THESE PROSPECTS. WHILE THEY PROBABLY WOULD NOT WANT TO PREVENT THE ETHIOPIAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE NOW IN PREPARATION, AND MAY HOPE FOR ITS MAXIMUM SUCCESS, THEY MAY ALSO HAVE AN INTEREST TO SEE NEGOTIATIONS EVENTUALLY TAKE PLACE WHICH WOULD ALLOW THEM TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE AS THE DEFENDER OF ETHIOPIA'S INTERESTS. THEY MIGHT NOT BE AVERSE, AT THIS POINT, AT LEAST TO HAVING THEIR PRESENT AND FUTURE ROLE RECOGNIZED BY THE US AND OTHERS, POSSIBLY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

US-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON THE SITUATION IN THE HORN BEGAN IN DECEMBER WITH A CALL BY AMBASSADOR TOON ON SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AND A SUBSEQUENT RESPONSE BY AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN TO THE SECRETARY. THE SUBJECT WAS AGAIN DISCUSSED BY THE SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON JANUARY 14. THESE EXCHANGES HAVE BEEN INCONCLUSIVE, BUT SUGGEST AT LEAST THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO HOLD A DIALOGUE WITH THE US ON THE HORN. IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW FAR THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO GO IN LIMITING THEIR OWN INVOLVEMENT (AND THAT OF CUBA), BUT THEY CLAIM TO HAVE UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE ETHIOPIANS CONSTRAINING USE OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE OUTSIDE ETHIOPIA'S TERRITORY. THEY HAVE MAINTAINED THAT SOMALI WITHDRAWAL FROM ETHIOPIAN TERRITORY IS A PREREQUISITE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO ACCEPT SOMETHING LESS THAN COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL AS A BASIS FOR URGING ADDIS ABABA TO INITIATE TALKS. IF AN INITIATIVE WERE CONTEMPLATED IN THE UN, PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD BE IN ORDER.

A LOOK AT THE WEIGHT OF THE STICK AVAILABLE TO US IN THIS CONNECTION UNDERLINES THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EXPLORING AND PURSUING THE FURTHER USE OF THE CARROT OF DIALOGUE. WE ALMOST CERTAINLY CANNOT MANIPULATE GRAIN SALES OR OTHER ELEMENTS IN OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP AS A FORM OF  
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COERCION ON SOVIET BEHAVIOR. MBFR OFFERS NOTHING USEFUL: IT IS TOO REMOTE, MULTILATERAL AND STAGNANT TO GIVE US A HANDLE ON SOVIET POLICY IN AFRICA. SALT IS NONE OF THESE THINGS, BUT THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN THE HORN AT PRESENT DO NOT WARRANT JEOPARDIZING OUR OWN INTEREST IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS IN AN ATTEMPT TO USE THEM AS A LEVER AGAINST THE SOVIETS. SUSPENSION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS

WOULD ALSO BE DETRIMENTAL TO OUR INTERESTS. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD, HOWEVER, PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO POINT OUT THE ANOMALY THAT COULD ARISE BETWEEN OUR MUTUAL EFFORT TO ACHIEVE ARMS RESTRAINT AND A MILITARY CONFLICT SUPPORTED BY SOVIET ARMS DEVELOPING IN AN IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT AREA.

#### KENYAN-SOMALI RELATIONS

PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK IN THE OGADEN, THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT ENDORSED OUR DECISION TO SUPPLY DEFENSIVE ARMS TO THE SOMALIS ON THE GROUNDS THAT A REDUCTION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOMALIA AND RELIANCE BY SOMALIA ON WESTERN COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO KENYA ENHANCED THE PROSPECTS FOR AN ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN KENYA AND SOMALIA. HOWEVER, THE OGADEN WAR HAS NOT ONLY HAD SOME SPILL-OVERS INTO THE SOMALI-INHABITED NORTHEAST PROVINCE OF KENYA RESULTING IN SOME SKIRMISHES BETWEEN SOMALIS AND KENYANS, IT HAS ALSO ALARMED THE KENYANS TO FEAR THAT SOMALIA WILL, ONCE IT HAS HAD ITS WAY IN THE OGADEN, SEEK TO CARRY OUT ITS DESIGNS IN KENYA. KENYA'S MUCH WEAKER MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WOULD BE LITTLE USE, THE KENYANS FEAR, AGAINST THE SOMALI FORCES. AS A RESULT THE KENYANS HAVE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THEIR SUPPORT FOR ETHIOPIA IN ITS CONFLICT WITH SOMALIA, INSISTED THAT NO TALKS SHOULD START UNTIL ALL SOMALI GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE OUT OF THE OGADEN, PREVENTED RELIEF? CONFIDENTIAL

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SHIPMENTS TO REFUGEES FROM THE OGADEN FIGHTING TO PASS FROM MOMBASA INTO SOMALIA, AND ANNOUNCED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HAVE MILITARY SUPPLIES DESTINED FOR ETHIOPIA PASS THROUGH MOMBASA. THEY HAVE BEEN UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT THAT SUPPORT FOR MENGISTU ENTRENCHES THE SOVIETS IN ETHIOPIA, THAT THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE AREA IS OF GREATER LONG-TERM CONCERN FOR KENYA THAN SOMALI IRREDENTISM, OR THAT THE SOVIET DECLINE IN SOMALIA DOES REPRESENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION WITH SOMALIA.

SOMALIA HAS ALSO BEEN UNHELPFUL BY MAKING STATEMENTS THAT ARE, AT BEST, AMBIGUOUS IN KENYAN EYES ON THE QUESTION OF SOMALIA'S TERRITORIAL DESIGNS. SOMALI SPOKESMEN HAVE MADE STATEMENTS THAT SOMALIA WOULD ACCEPT A DECISION TAKEN BY THE SOMALIS IN KENYA TO REMAIN AS KENYANS: SUCH STATEMENTS ARE ANATHEMA TO KENYAN AUTHORITIES WHO HAVE NO INTENTION OF PERMITTING KENYA'S SOMALIS AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEIR PREFERENCE BETWEEN REMAINING KENYANS OR JOINING SOMALIA. THE DEGREE OF PARANOIA IN THE KENYAN FEARS OF SOMALI IRREDENTISM MAY RESULT IN PART FROM KENYAN FEELINGS OF GUILT OVER THE FACT THAT THE KENYAN SOMALIS HAVE BEEN LARGELY NEGLECTED BY THE NAIROBI GOVERNMENT IN TERMS OF

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS. THIS IS ALSO A FACTOR IN SOMALI AMBIGUITY: BEFORE ABANDONING IN ANY FORMAL WAY THEIR CLAIMS TO THE AREA, THE SOMALI AUTHORITIES MAY WISH TO EXTRACT FROM KENYA ASSURANCES OF A BETTER FUTURE DEAL FOR THE KENYAN SOMALIS.

PRESSURE FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES, MOST RECENTLY IVORY COAST PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY, HAS MOVED THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT TO PROPOSE A NON-AGGRESSION PACT WITH KENYA. THE KENYANS ARE SUSPICIOUS. IT WOULD SEEM TO BE IN OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE AN ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN KENYA AND SOMALIA. SUCCESS IN THAT EFFORT WOULD PLUG A GAP WHICH NOW EXISTS IN THE UNANIMITY OF OPPOSITION TO SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN ETHIOPIA AMONG STATES BORDERING

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THAT COUNTRY.

ERITREA

WHILE THE ERITREAN SITUATION RAISES A NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT GO SOMEWHAT BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS PAPER, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE OGADEN AND ERITREAN SITUATIONS DO BEAR SOME RELATIONSHIP TO EACH OTHER: A VICTORY BY THE ERITREANS, WHILE IT WOULD BE A BLOW TO THE ETHIOPIANS, WOULD NONETHELESS RELEASE SOME 25,000 TROOPS FOR USE IN THE OGADEN; A SETTLEMENT ALONG REGIONAL AUTONOMY LINES IN ONE OF THE TWO REGIONS COULD ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCH A SETTLEMENT IN THE OTHER; INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE NEGOTIATION ON ONE OF THESE ISSUES COULD RAISE QUESTIONS CONCERNING WHY SIMILAR EFFORTS ARE NOT BEING MADE WITH RESPECT TO THE OTHER.

### 3. ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS

THE FOREGOING ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THAT A VARIETY OF ACTIONS ARE OPEN TO US. SOME SEEM WORTH WHILE IMPLEMENTING NOW, OTHERS HOLD LITTLE PROMISE OF SUCCESS, STILL OTHERS MIGHT BE HELPFUL AT A LATER STAGE. BECAUSE OF THE CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED ON THE BATTLEFIELD, WE BELIEVE THAT PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ARE NOT LIKELY TO IMPROVE UNTIL THE ETHIOPIANS HAVE AT LEAST DEMONSTRATED THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE SOMALIS MORE FULLY OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. INITIATIVES AT THIS TIME, THEREFORE, ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE USEFUL IN SETTING THE STAGE FOR FUTURE FURTHER ACTIVITY THAN IN MOVING THE PARTIES TOWARD THE BARGAINING TABLE NOW AND IN MAKING A RECORD OF CONCERN

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OVER THE CONFLICT RATHER THAN INDIFFERENCE. ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN NOW AND OUR VIEWS ON THEM FOLLOW:

(1) UNDERTAKE CONSULTATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH THE BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMANS, TO BE FOLLOWED BY A SEPARATE BILATERAL US-ITALIAN CONSULTATION, TO ACQUAINT OUR ALLIES WITH OUR CURRENT VIEWS ON THE HORN, OUR PERCEPTION OF THE NEW URGENCY, INJECTED BY THE SOVIET/CUBAN BUILD-UP, IN THE ATTEMPT TO SECURE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, AND TO INDICATE THE DIRECTIONS WE INTEND TO MOVE AND SEEK THEIR COMMENTS. THIS MOVE IS VIRTUALLY REQUIRED BY THE HISTORY OF QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS ON THE HORN AND WOULD BE A USEFUL MECHANISM FOR TESTING OUR IDEAS AGAINST THE THINKING OF LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES HAVING THEMSELVES CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE AREA.

APPROVE        DISAPPROVE        DELAY  
(RECOMMENDED)

(2) URGE THE ITALIANS TO USE THEIR GOOD OFFICES TO MEDIATE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA. WHILE THIS IDEA HAS SOME ATTRACTION, GIVEN THE HISTORICAL TIES BETWEEN ITALY AND BOTH CONTENDING PARTIES AND THE FACT THAT THE ITALIANS HAVE INDICATED AN INTEREST IN DOING SO, THE PRESENT POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY IN ITALY MAKES THE ITALIANS SOMETHING OF AN UNCERTAIN FACTOR. IN ADDITION, IT MIGHT REQUIRE TOO MUCH OF A STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION TO PLACE AN ITALIAN EFFORT UNDER THE OAU UMBRELLA, WITHOUT WHICH SUCH AN INITIATIVE WOULD BE A DEPARTURE FROM OUR PRESENT POSITION THAT AFRICAN PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SOLVED BY AFRICANS. THAT IS A POSITION WE MIGHT HAVE TO ABANDON, BUT NOT UNTIL WE HAVE DECIDED TO GIVE UP COMPLETELY ON THE OAU.

APPROVE        DISAPPROVE        DELAY  
--- (RECOMMENDED)

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(3) URGE THE NIGERIANS TO REINVIGORATE THE OAU MEDIATION EFFORTS. WHILE THE NIGERIAN EFFORTS TO DATE HAVE NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE, WE HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL DIPLOMATIC INVESTMENT IN THE POSITION THAT AFRICAN PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SOLVED BY AFRICANS. ONE OF THE MORE EFFECTIVE POINTS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET BUILD-UP IS THAT

IT UNDERMINES THE OAU EFFORT. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, SUCH AS THE INCREASE IN CUBAN COMBAT PERSONNEL, THE HOUPHOUET EFFORT WITH THE SOMALIS AND KENYANS, AND OTHER STEPS OF OURS MIGHT IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS OF THE OAU EFFORT. IT SEEMS WORTH AT LEAST ONE LAST TRY.

APPROVE          DISAPPROVE      DELAY  
(RECOMMENDED)

(4) ENCOURAGE THE MALAGASY MEDIATION EFFORT, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THE FRENCH. OF SEVERAL MEDIATION ATTEMPTS UNDERTAKEN OUTSIDE THE FORMAL OAU FRAMEWORK, ONLY THE EFFORT BY MADAGASCAR STILL SEEMS TO HAVE ANY LIFE. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY TO HAVE ANY GREAT HOPE OF SUCCESS, PURSUING IT COULD COMPLICATE OTHER EFFORTS, AND IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO HAVE ANY INPUT INTO THE EFFORT, GIVEN THE POOR STATE OF US-MALAGASY RELATIONS. IT RETAINS THE AFRICAN UMBRELLA, BUT IS IN A SENSE COMPETING WITH THE FORMAL OAU NIGERIAN EFFORT.

APPROVE          DISAPPROVE      DELAY  
---              (RECOMMENDED)

(5) PURSUE MORE VIGOROUSLY THE IDEA OF A UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. PREVIOUS LACK OF ENTHUSIASM OR HOSTILITY TO THIS IDEA MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM MISUNDER-  
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STANDING AS TO WHAT MIGHT BE INVOLVED. A UNSC RESOLUTION, THE MAIN LINES OF WHICH WERE CLEARED IN ADVANCE WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE SOVIETS, WHICH AVOIDED A TILT TO EITHER SIDE, PROVIDED FORMAL INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ENDORSEMENT TO THE OAU MEDIATION EFFORT, AND WAS HANDLED IN DEBATE TO AVOID CONTENTION MIGHT WELL SECURE THE SUPPORT OF THOSE PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED. SUCH A RESOLUTION MIGHT HELP TO REINVIGORATE THE OAU EFFORT AND, AT A MINIMUM, WOULD UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND DEMONSTRATE THAT IT WAS NOT SIMPLY BEING IGNORED BY THE POWERS GREAT AND SMALL. HOWEVER, THE UNDERTAKING WOULD BE DELICATE AND WOULD REQUIRE EXTENSIVE CONSULTATION IN ADVANCE WITH MANY GOVERNMENTS. IT SHOULD PERHAPS BE HELD IN ABEYANCE FOR NOW WHILE WE PROCEED WITH OTHER SOUNDINGS.

APPROVE          DISAPPROVE      DELAY  
---              (RECOMMENDED)

(6) INTENSIFY OUR DIALOGUE ON THE HORN WITH THE SOVIETS. THIS WOULD INVOLVE MORE SPECIFIC EFFORTS ON OUR PART TO TRY TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS OF THE VALUE TO THEM OF A

NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, OF THE NECESSITY FOR THEM TO EXERT INFLUENCE TOWARD THAT END ON THE ETHIOPIANS, OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONTEMPLATE A CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA WHICH DID NOT INVOLVE THE PROJECTION OF PRESSURES ON OTHER REGIONAL FRIENDS OF OURS NOR PRESSURES AGAINST OUR OWN NORMAL PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA. IT MIGHT REQUIRE SOME INDICATION, PERHAPS THROUGH THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS, OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE IN SEEKING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. IT COULD EVENTUALLY MOVE TO DISCUSSION OF WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE THE OUTLINES OF A SETTLEMENT, WHILE AVOIDING THE APPEARANCE OF A SUPERPOWER-DICTATED SETTLEMENT.

APPROVE        DISAPPROVE        DELAY  
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(RECOMMENDED)

(7) ENCOURAGE THE YUGOSLAVS TO URGE THE ETHIOPIANS TO NEGOTIATE. THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE GOOD ACCESS TO THE ETHIOPIANS, BASED ON THEIR NON-ALIGNED STATUS, AND THEY MIGHT WELL BE ATTRACTED TO PLAYING A ROLE IN BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. THEY MIGHT BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN SELLING THE IDEA OF A SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF REGIONAL AUTONOMY FOR THE OGADEN (AND ERITREA?), GIVEN YUGOSLAV

EXPERIENCE WITH THEIR OWN AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS.

APPROVE        DISAPPROVE        DELAY  
(RECOMMENDED)

(8) AN APPROACH TO THE INDIANS TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO USE THEIR GOOD OFFICES WITH THE ETHIOPIANS TO PERSUADE THEM TO NEGOTIATE. THE RATHER MODEST INDIAN MILITARY AID TO ETHIOPIA DOES NOT PROVIDE INDIA WITH A PARTICULARLY HEFTY DEGREE OF INFLUENCE WITH THE ETHIOPIANS. NONETHELESS, ON THE THEORY THAT EVERY LITTLE BIT HELPS, IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT HURT TO HAVE THE INDIANS ECHOING WHAT WE HOPE TO STIMULATE OTHERS TO SAY TO THE ETHIOPIANS. IT MIGHT BE A COMPLICATION FOR THE INDIANS TO BE IN THE FOREFRONT, HOWEVER, AND IT THEREFORE MIGHT BE BEST TO SAVE AN APPROACH TO THEM UNTIL A LATER STAGE.

APPROVE        DISAPPROVE        DELAY  
---                    (RECOMMENDED)

(9) CONSULT WITH THE SAUDIS, IRANIANS AND EGYPTIANS. THIS IS CLEARLY ESSENTIAL BOTH IN VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH THESE COUNTRIES ON THE  
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HORN AND, SPECIFICALLY, BECAUSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT TRIP TO THE AREA. IN ADDITION TO COMPARING NOTES ON THE SITUATION, THESE CONSULTATIONS, WHICH WOULD BEST BE CONTINUED THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS IN THE RESPECTIVE CAPITALS, WOULD PROVIDE US WITH OPPORTUNITIES TO PERSUADE THE MIDDLE EASTERNERS THAT ANY EFFORTS ON OUR PART TO SECURE SOVIET COOPERATION IN THE HORN WOULD NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF CONSOLIDATING THE SOVIET POSITION IN ETHIOPIA BUT WOULD, INSTEAD, BE PART OF AN EFFORT TO ALTER THE CONDITIONS THAT ENABLED THE SOVIETS TO SECURE SO SUBSTANTIAL A FOOTHOLD. THESE CONSULTATIONS COULD ALSO BE USED TO SOLICIT INTERVENTION BY THESE COUNTRIES WITH THE SOMALIS AS NECESSARY TO SECURE BEHAVIOR FROM THE SOMALIS WHICH WOULD HELP TO ADVANCE NEGOTIATIONS.

APPROVE          DISAPPROVE      DELAY  
(RECOMMENDED)

(10) SUPPORT ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN SOMALIA AND KENYA. WE HAVE ALREADY REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT TO THE SOMALIS THE VALUE TO THEM OF CALMING KENYAN FEARS AND SECURING IMPROVED KENYAN-SOMALI RELATIONS. OUR AMBASSADOR IN NAIROBI HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO URGE THE KENYANS TO RECOGNIZE THAT AN ENHANCED SOVIET POSITION IN THE AREA SHOULD BE A MATTER OF GREATER CONCERN TO THEM THAN A

THREAT FROM SOMALIA, WHICH THREAT COULD, IN FACT BE MINIMIZED BY KENYAN STEPS TO SEEK AN UNDERSTANDING WITH SOMALIA. AN OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE THESE THOUGHTS WILL COME IN LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY WHEN A HIGH-LEVEL KENYAN DELEGATION VISITS WASHINGTON. WE ARE SEEKING INFORMATION ON WHAT MAY HAVE PASSED BETWEEN KENYA AND SOMALIA. DEPENDING ON THE RESULTS OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS, WE PLAN TO INDICATE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA AND TO ENCOURAGE HOUPHOUET TO TRY NOW TO ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY WITH THE KENYANS.

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APPROVE          DISAPPROVE      DELAY  
(RECOMMENDED)

(11) SECURE IDEAS AND PLEDGES FOR REWARDS WHICH MIGHT BE HELD OUT TO STIMULATE BOTH ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA TO NEGOTIATE. SUCH IDEAS AND PLEDGES COULD BE SOLICITED IN



THE COURSE OF OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES, OUR MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN FRIENDS, AND EVENTUALLY THE SOVIETS.

APPROVE        DISAPPROVE        DELAY  
(RECOMMENDED)

(12) ENCOURAGE THE ARABS AND AFRICANS TO CONSULT ON THE ISSUE. SUCH CONSULTATIONS WOULD TEND TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE DISPUTE WOULD TAKE ON AN AFRICAN VS. ARAB NATURE. THEY COULD ALSO LEAD TO SOME INITIATIVES IN TERMS OF MEDIATION AND WOULD BE A PREREQUISITE TO THE USE OF ANY JOINT OAU/ARAB LEAGUE MECHANISMS TO, FOR INSTANCE, MONITOR A CEASE-FIRE.

APPROVE        DISAPPROVE        DELAY  
(RECOMMENDED)

(13) INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE CUBANS, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY (E.G. THROUGH MEXICO) TO URGE RESTRAINT IN THE HORN. IT IS BY NO MEANS A CERTAINTY THAT CUBAN AND SOVIET OBJECTIVES ARE IDENTICAL AND IT MIGHT BE WORTH PROBING TO ASCERTAIN IF THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY OF PERSUADING THE CUBANS TO SUPPORT NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE KILLING.

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APPROVE        DISAPPROVE        DELAY  
(RECOMMENDED)

4. THIS MEMORANDUM IS JOINTLY FROM AF, EUR AND S/P;  
CLEARANCES INCLUDE S/MS, NEA, PM, ARA AND IO.  
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